Collapsible Communism. The Moscow Coup

Almost every detail of the coup was astounding.  Although many claim that the very fact of it happening was not at all surprising, both Western sources and Yeltsin’s camp reluctantly admitted that there was no intelligence information about the forthcoming putsch.  This astonishing fact escaped the attention of most correspondents, so it must be worth considering.  History provides numerous examples of intelligence warnings being ignored; but a lack of any intelligence data before such an event demands a logical rather than historical explanation.  Logically, there are three possibilities:

1. All preparations were efficiently kept secret;
2. All intelligence services involved proved to have been entirely useless;
3. There were no preparations at all.

The first of these possibilities implies considerable sophistication on the plotters’ part, which, in the light of further developments, renders this assertion highly unlikely.  The second possibility, in turn, in light of many earlier developments, seems likely, at least as far as the incompetence of Western services is concerned.  But this assertion fails to solve the mystery of Yeltsin’s camp having not been forewarned.  Yeltsin claimed a following in the army, so it would seem reasonable to expect him to be well-informed of any action planned against him.  Hence, either he knew what was afoot; or he was not as popular as he claimed; or the third assertion is correct.

The idea of someone attempting a coup d’état, and in the world’s largest country (and a superpower) without preparing the takeover in any detectable way, would be laughable, if it did not happen to match the image of the plotters – hastily promoted by both Western media and the soviets – as just a bunch of sully drunken amateurs longing for the good old days.  Indeed, so much did they love the old days that they forgot their old ways.  They clumsily forgot about well tried spetznaz and omon troops, and used recruits and ceremonial guards instead.  They cheerfully forgot that does not attempt to storm buildings with columns of tanks when one has almost unlimited numbers of helicopters at one’s disposal.  They happily forgot to cut off the communication lines, or in other words, they were unable to do what the primitive Croatian militia did at a moment’s notice to the Yugoslav Federal Army bases on their territory.  Well, this is what we are led to believe.  We are told that the plotters had begged the arrested Mr Gorbachëv to receive them and he refused: Gorbi the Defiant.  Gorbachëv meanwhile walked frequently to the beach to show himself o the public and expose the lie of “ill health”: Gorbi the Smart. [The Daily Telegraph, 4 September 1991, p 8]

However, to forget so many chapters of their soviet textbook, the ‘plotters’ must have been led to believe that either it would not be necessary to act decisively at all or that someone would do so for them.  The only person in a position to trick the plotters into action was Gorbachëv himself.  So, the state committee formed on August 19^th most probably expected one absent member to do all the necessary work.  This would explain the mysterious lack of preparations.  When the absent friend remained absent, they carried on regardless, because of the presence of Kryuchkov and Pugo among them.  Inevitably, the sincerity of these two members taking part in the committee has to be questioned.  Inviting the youthful Yavlinsky to witness Pugo’s arrest, and the bizarre story of the kgb squad phoning the man about to be arrested, [see Reuters, 24.8.1991] casts serious doubt on his alleged suicide.

Stripped of pretence, we were treated to a tasteless performance indeed: the drunken cowardice of “stalinists” (in dark colours) against the courageous leadership of “democrats” (in white, with broad smiles).  (A rare example of a courageous challenge to the united front presented by the media was given by Mr Peter Simple [The Daily Telegraph, 25 August 1991] who called the coup “a public relations exercise, a stage-managed charade” and an “unconvincing show, as of badly rehearsed actors”.)  Some well known suspense building techniques were employed to notable effect.  The column of tanks endlessly moving through the streets of Moscow towards the “White House”, was highly reminiscent of comrade Eisenstein’s Odessa steps massacre in his Battleship Potyomkin.  (The role of soviet film editors was picked up by Western correspondents who spliced the cavalcade into pieces and brought it together again in their news bulletins.)  There were also some farcical tricks, like Mr Yeltsin’s call to the troops to defy orders of “the junta”, transmitted ad nauseam on state television.  (Oh, the plotters forgot to cut him off.)  As for the trumpeted frequent chats with the US President (they forgot again!), they belonged to the realm of surrealism.

The gains secured by Gorbachëv as the events unfolded were initially worth paying the price of the public “humiliation” he suffered at the hands of Yeltsin shortly after his return to Moscow.  And it would appear that this was the only price he was then made to pay.  The unthinkable happened: the Moscow crowds and the world’s leaders demanded in unison the reinstatement of a communist, thereby lending apparent legitimacy to his illegitimate rule.  That in itself amounted to an unparalleled propaganda coup.  All the other gains were bonuses.  Moreover, the strengthening of Yeltsin’s position would give Gorbachëv fresh room for manoeuvre and would take much of the blame for the state of the economy off his shoulders.  Getting rid of the ballast of the communist party must be seen as a blessing, since a duplicate state power apparatus has always been in place (since Lenin), and could immediately substitute for the party.  The breaking up of the kgb into three leaner entities – a process further elaborated subsequently by Yeltsin, who conspicuously left the central intelligence apparatus under Primakov untouched – would make the future operations much more effective.  Removing all possible obstacles in the way of Western aid puts pressure on Western governments: either they come up with the lump sum required (in billions of Dollars, please) or they will be “blamed” for the “failure of reforms”.  The panic reaction of the world’s stock exchanges to the news from Moscow, on the so called Red Monday, could not pass unnoticed among the soviet planners, as it opened fantastic perspectives for future manipulation.  The credibility given by the “failed coup” to the past and future warnings of a “hardline backlash to reforms” points the way for further deception.

Still, the obvious deficiencies of a cui bono argument ought not to let us get carried away.  We have to be a little bit more self-critical than the credulous “believers”, in places such as the British Foreign Office.  The crucial question remains the same: is it at all possible to stage-manage such a complicated chain of events?  How could it have been directed when so many people were involved?  Comedia dell’arte of the masses?

Managing the stage

To orchestrate such an extensive performance – that is to say, to generate a sequence of dramatic events in order to create the pretext for, and the circumstances surrounding, a decisive apparent adjustment (on this occasion, the appearance of the burial of communism, in order to prepare the ground for “convergence” with the West) – it is necessary to create conditions for people to behave in a predictable way.  At the same time, it is necessary to be able to rely upon the limited number of performers acting willingly, and in the manner required.

It is a well known fact that the behaviour of masses is far more predictable than that of individuals.  A large gathering of people faced with a small group of determined and well armed attackers is likely to disperse in panic (unless well organised).  The same gathering, faced with indecisive, unsuitably armed (unsuitably for the purpose in hand, for instance, in tanks) squaddies, would be very likely to “remain defiant” and to “display considerable courage”.  Bravery among the crowd will arise in proportion to the chronic dithering of their opponents.  There can, of course, be no question of mocking the bravery of many individuals involved.  It takes a lot of courage to stand in front of a tank with an engine roaring, let alone to jump on top of it and start dragging the soldiers out.  But it is certainly easier to do so when soldiers conduct themselves in the ineffective way they did last August on the streets of Moscow.

In the case of individuals, the predictability of their behaviour seems to be correlated to their intellectual ability.  This would apply to some of the plotters; however, it is foreseeable that should the communication lines of a surrounded building remain intact, it is only to be expected that the people inside would use them to pronounce their defiant stance and to appeal to surrounding forces, whatever their IQ might be.

All these elements, although important, amount to no more than setting the stage.  And the stage was set for the star appearance of one Boris Yeltsin.

It did not require a great deal of prophetic power to state that Mr Yeltsin would fiercely defend himself when under attack; that he would use all available communications when besieged; and that he would get a hero status in the West after his successful “defence of democracy in Russia”.  At the same time, it is not unthinkable that the star was also involved in managing the stage.  The relationship between Messrs Gorbachëv and Yeltsin has displayed all the dialectical characteristics of a classic double act.  In his early days, Gorbachëv was seen to have been involved in a power struggle with that “conservative” stick-in-the-mud, Yegor Ligachëv, whose constant challenge to the principles of perestroika gave credit to the alleged difficulties Gorbachëv was encountering in implementing the reforms – thereby providing Gorbachëv with a rationale which could be applied for public consumption to explain the leader’s repeated reluctance to “proceed with radical reforms”.  From the “left wing”. Gorbachëv’s position was later perceived to have been threatened by the “maverick” Yeltsin (maverick, incidentally, being the categorisation invariably awarded to personalities whom tired and confused journalists cannot begin to understand, but of whose activities they vaguely disapprove).  Thus, surrounded by Bad Guys, Gorbachëv was hailed by the receptive Western media as the only hope for the future; and his ill defined perestroika policies appeared to be the only sensible way forward.

In the process, it must have become obvious to the Kremlin’s planners that the apparatus of the cpsu could have been relied upon to resist the painful change, just as every establishment in the world would be liable to do.  Since the “conservatives” did not need to be conducted from the top, Ligachëv was made redundant but a credible power base was needed for Yeltsin.

In every communist society, it has been well established by precedent that in order to obtain popularity all one needs to do is to be critical of the communist party; and that, this being the case, the disinformation and manipulation apparatus implements personality and personnel changes, from time to time, by catapulting to prominence individuals who are prepared to do precisely that, flattering their egos in the process by bathing them in the publicity limelight now available thanks to modern communications.

Cynical ploys

Yeltsin’s dramatic gesture of over-publicly destroying his party card was thus a cynical ploy to boost his stance in the eyes of the public.  Subsequently, Yeltsin was given a mandate without parallel in the history of soviet communism: he won the presidential election.  Unfortunately, this was not enough to promote him to the status of international statesman.  There was also an urgent need for some extraordinary events – a series of dramatic events, creating the appearance of irreversible change – to procure for him the status, which he was so manifestly refused during his earlier (drunken) visit to the United States and, more notably, to the European parliament.

And yet, although it is inconceivable, we must at least consider the unlikely possibility that Yeltsin is an honest man and that his “struggle for democratisation” is genuine.  If this is the case, then he is a pawn in the planners’ hands.  There was, however, enough evidence of collusion between Yeltsin and Gorbachëv to suggest otherwise.  It emerged from between the lines, as it did in Gorbachëv’s story of the discussions between himself, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev being bugged by the kgb or unfortunate disclosure of the control of the soviet gold reserves. [see: The Times, 14 November 1991, p 1: “the joint authority had come about after a series of ‘consultations’ between the two presidents, although there was no written agreement”]

For adherents of the collapse theory, it must remain imaginable that two sides in an alleged power struggle agree the terms of joint control over one of the eventual rewards of this struggle.  Having said that, I see the uneasy relationship between the two men as equals so it may evolve into a personal struggle or not, as the case may be.  Bearing in mind that Yeltsin’s “Russia” is a vehicle supposed to lift him to the top and to further muddle the waters of the real Russia’s long fight against communism.  In fact, the powers behind Yeltsin, far from “killing off” the soviet centre, have put a lot of effort to keep it alive.  The idea of the “Commonwealth of Sovereign States” provides a perfect example of this ideological kinship: a similar project was floated by the Gorbachëv’s camp in October, the crucial new element introduced by Yeltsin was that Gorbachëv himself was to be excluded from participation in the soviet union under a new name.  I believe Yeltsin was sincere when he spoke of his desire to “stop disintegration of the soviet union”.

Yeltsin’s “Russia” also helped to propel Yeltsin into the consciousness of the international psyche, just as Gorbachëv was propelled in earlier years; and it masks the purge of the system which is going on behind the scenes, under the guise of the collapse and dismantling of communism.  Most significantly of all, it serves the central purpose of facilitating the apparent geographical carve up of the “former” soviet union, so that it can be “digested” by an anxious West into the “Common European Home”.  Disguising the purpose is the central objective.

The shortsightedness of the Western commentators. Leadin to fundamental misrepresentations, is the true backbone of soviet strategy.  This was made manifestly obvious during the so called Eastern European revolutions in 1989.  A short glance back at 1989 may throw some light on the current soviet developments or, more precisely, on the way they are being shaped to suit the Western frame of mind.

The unparalleled chain of events brought about what was perceived as the “collapse of communism”.  Commies were seemingly swept away.  For instance, the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister gave up his communist party card and was declared by the Western media to be “the first non-communist Premier of Czechoslovakia for over 40 years”.  Democracy was restored.  For example, 35% of seats in the lower house was freely contested in the Polish “free parliamentary elections”.  Capitalism was on everyone’s lips, e.g. on “former” apparatchiks lips.  Being the only people with any money, they were quick to benefit from privatisation programmes.  The dreaded communist security services were purged, reformed and… left intact.  For instance, out of 3,051 sb (Polish counterpart of the kgb) officers working in the ministry of internal affairs, 2,867 were accepted for further service.  The same applies to the armed forces, the judiciary and, largely, to the mass media throughout Eastern Europe.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the “revolutions ‘89” was that they were all sparked off by the security services.  This has now been soundly documented so the “believers” in the collapse theory had to come up with a suitable explanation.  They accepted that Gorbachëv had had his hand in starting the changes.  “But,” they suggest, “it all went out of control and the outcome was not beneficial to Moscow.”

In fact, the “revolutions” resulted in the “former communists” together with “former fellow travellers” grasping all relevant positions of power under the disguise of nations celebrating their freedom.  Any traces of genuine anti-communism were successfully upstaged by the loud rhetoric of the likes of Messrs Havel and Wałęsa, and any remnants of political emigration were effectively mopped up.  The West, overwhelmed by joy, accepted the principle of “Common European Home”.  Was all that not enough for the Kremlin planners?  It was not.  The same had to be done in Moscow.

But let us follow for awhile the way of the believers’ thinking.

Let’s assume that it all indeed went out of hand in Eastern Europe.  We must then accept that the security forces had the means, the will and the necessary vision to plan and engineer such dramatic changes but at the same time had no contingency plans in the event they found themselves unable to control the upheaval.  Furthermore, after they had lost control in one country they started similar processes in another only to lose control again.  Suicides?  “No,” we’re being told, “they lost faith in the ideology and came to truly love democracy.”  Notwithstanding the faith, the entire operation was so significant that it must have been supervised from Moscow, by the head of kgb, comrade Vladimir Kryuchkov.  Now, did he love democracy as much as his Eastern European chekist colleagues?  Because if he didn’t then his strategy in 1989 is inexplicable; but if he did then his coup attempt last August must have been a deception game.  In any case, Kryuchkov is neither “democrat” nor a “hardliner”, he is a communist.  He is wholeheartedly attached to the long term objective of communism.  His actions were merely preparing the final stage of a long-standing plan.

The overwhelming majority of observers wish to see it differently: the August coup was n attempted act of revenge of the hardline forces against the people responsible for losing Eastern Europe.  The trouble is that Kryuchkov was involved in both the Eastern European “revolutions” and in the coup.  Perhaps the fear of democratic forces made him act the way he did; however, since he oversaw the triggering of the Eastern European upheaval and was clearly incapable of managing the fast moving events, he ought to avoid it in the future, let alone start another cataclysm himself.  In other words, following the assumptions of the collapse theory we must come to the conclusion that Kryuchkov and his cronies were no more than a bunch of schizoids acting in a self-destructing manner and motivated by a heady cocktail of love and fear of democracy, utterly unable to learn from their past mistakes and to adjust their actions accordingly.

It is no less than foolish to take one’s enemy for a foll.  The bathe; of Marengo was won because Napoleon acted as if Melas, his Austrian opponent, were a Napoleon, while Melas proceeded as if Napoleon were a Melas.

There is a saying that you can fool everyone most of the time and you can fool most of the people all of the time but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.  It surely must take a genius to deceive the whole world, doesn’t it?  Do Gorbachëv and Yeltsin have the fitting qualities, though?  Their actions, however skilful, are not flawless.  We’re in danger of overestimating their personal abilities and underestimating their well-proven Method.  But their real strength lies unexpectedly on the Western side, where there is neither will nor knowledge to challenge the consensus of the collapse theory.  Individuals voicing their doubts are ignored and marginalised, while mass media are locked in a commercial vortex: profit making demands large audiences, large audiences demand optimism.  To portray the ridiculous nature of Western perception of the soviet union for what it is, would be indigestible for Western consumers.

English language has a wonderful phrase for being duped: to be taken for a ride.  It sounds so innocent and care free; it smacks of childhood jokes.  But in the case of soviet strategic deception plan, it is worth asking where the West is being taken.  What is this ride leading to?

The US Government, after the prolonged aid campaign, will have been left the most indebted government in the world.  Unable to repay its debts and with fast growing budget deficit, it will no longer play guardian to the free world trade.  It will have to concentrate on internal problems and that, together with the constant insult of internal anti-americanism, will have forced the US to retreat into isolationism.  At the same time, the social trends manifestly exposed by the spreading of a disease of political correctness do not bide well for individual freedom in America.  There is no need for the red army to invade Portugal or Denmark.  It will be left for the local politicians to submit their nations to a great idea of One Sovereign Prison of Nations stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic.

It is perhaps proper, nonetheless ironic, that the once glorious Western culture, which justifiably claimed one of its roots in Homer’s epic, is bound to fall victim to a ruthless aggressor cleverly faking defeat.  The joy of the Trojans was rather short lived.

Who knows no history is bound to repeat past mistakes.

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To mark the 25th anniversary of the Moscow coup, we are publishing above the original version of the article published in January 1992 in Soviet Analyst, Volume 21, Number 3